










 Abstract—Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) suffer from a 
wide range of security attacks due to their limited processing 
and energy capabilities.  Their use in numerous mission critical 
applications, however, requires that fast recovery from such 
attacks be achieved. Much research has been completed on 
detection of security attacks, while very little attention has been 
paid to recovery from an attack. In this paper, we propose a 
novel, lightweight authentication protocol that can secure 
network and node recovery operations such as re-clustering 
and reprogramming.  
Our protocol is based on hash functions and we compare the 
performance of two well-known lightweight hash functions, 
SHA-1 and Rabin. We demonstrate that our authentication 
protocol can be implemented efficiently on a sensor network 
test-bed with TelosB motes.  Further, our experimental results 
show that our protocol is efficient both in terms of 
computational overhead and execution times which makes it 
suitable for low resourced sensor devices. 
 
Keywords-Wireless sensor network, hash function, 
authentication. 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks are deployed in many mission 
critical applications and for monitoring of critical areas of 
national defence.  
With their development, various novel security attacks 
have appeared. The aims of these attacks are usually to take 
over nodes in the network, destroy nodes or to disrupt data 
flow. Since the base station can easily detect if only a few 
nodes are sending anomalous data (there are many protocols 
for this in the literature- see for example [13]), attacks are 
usually based on compromise of a large part of the network. 
Detection and recovery from these attacks have become 
major challenges in protecting sensor networks.  
   In this paper, we focus on recovery after an attack has been 
detected. We assume that the network is low resourced but 
has the capability to self-organize (cluster), detect an attack 
on the nodes, determine which nodes have been 
compromised (with high probability) and make a decision to 
reprogram compromised nodes. 
Numerous papers have been written on clustering, 
re-clustering, attack detection and reprogramming [4], [13], 
[11], [7], however, this is not the focus of our paper. 
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   In a recovery operation, it is critical that messages from the 
base station requesting re-clustering or reprogramming be 
authenticated, as otherwise, a denial of service attack can be 
launched by anyone intending to cause havoc in the WSN. 
Our focus is on ensuring that authentication is effective and 
efficient. In the protocols presented here, we are assuming 
only that authentication has been implemented, and ignore 
other means of securing data such as encryption. 
    In particular, the contributions of this paper are:  
• An efficient authenticated reprogramming request 
protocol from the base station to a compromised node. 
• An efficient authenticated reprogramming request 
protocol from an aggregator node to the base station on 
behalf of a compromised node. 
• An efficient authenticated re-clustering protocol from 
the base station to the network. 
• A comparison of two lightweight well-known hash 
functions used in the authentication protocols and 
implemented with TelosB motes 
   The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. After an 
overview on related work in Section II, we present the system 
assumptions in Section III. Three authentication protocols 
are then presented in Section IV. These protocols are based 
on the use of a hash function and so, in Section V the two 
hash functions used are compared and tested in settings 
varying between 8 and 64-bit input. In Section VI, we 
examine attack scenarios and the security of our proposed 
scheme against them. The performance of the scheme is 
discussed in Section VII and includes comparison with other 
authentication schemes used in WSN recovery. Section VIII 
concludes the paper.  
II.    RELATED WORK 
   A number of authentication methods have been proposed in 
WSNs. In this section, we give an overview of this work. 
   Perrig et. al. [17] proposed the μTESLA protocol to 
securely broadcast messages in a WSN. This protocol uses a 
one-way hash chain (OHC) to authenticate broadcast 
messages. To tolerate packet losses, μTESLA has been 
extended by introducing multi-level OHCs [14]. A 
higher-level OHC is used to bootstrap low-level OHCs. 
These methods require time synchronization which is not 
practical in a low-resource WSN. Hu et. al. [8] proposed a 
secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks, in 
which an OHC is used to thwart malicious routing request 
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 floods. OHCs were used in INSSENS to limit broadcast 
floods for control routing updates in WSNs [4]. In using 
OHCs, problems unique to unicast messages must be 
addressed, for example, maintaining OHCs when many 
packets are lost, and generating and storing OHCs in a highly 
resource-constrained node. 
   General cryptographic authentication methods based on 
public-key cryptosystems tend to be unreasonable for use in 
WSNs because of the very low calculation capability and 
small memory [10]. Nevertheless, some researchers have 
suggested using such security mechanisms in sensor 
networks and the TinySec development of Karlof, Sastri and 
Wagner in 2004 [9] was developed to tackle the problems 
head on. It aims at providing all of access control, message 
authentication, data confidentiality and avoidance of replay 
attacks. However, TinySec does not specify any key 
pre-distribution method but assigns a global key to the 
system, stored always in the same location. “Thus, an 
attacker seeking the TinySec key need only target a 
well-known address or area of memory.” [6]. 
   In all schemes using authentication, some kind of key is 
needed and the question of key storage is critical to 
maintaining a WSN. In virtually all known schemes for 
WSNs, keys are stored on nodes and thus require a tamper 
resistant location or an assumption that an attacker is unable 
to retrieve the keys. An exception to this is given, for 
example in the paper [5] where the authors use public key 
cryptography for authentication in which the private key is 
stored on a PC. A hash chain is produced by the PC and the 
nodes must verify all messages from the PC itself. This is a 
time-consuming undertaking and needs each node to be able 
to communicate with the PC at all times.  In addition, it is 
important that messages be received sequentially so that they 
can be reconstructed. In an attack scenario, this is not an 
assumption that can be made. 
   Our aim is to provide authentication for recovery message 
transmissions in a WSN in an efficient and effective manner 
with the goal of extending the life of the WSN for as long as 
possible. An examination of the above work leads us to 
implementation of a hash function method in a protocol 
which also provides protection against message content 
changes, message authorship changes and replay attacks. As 
we include remote location of the WSN without possibility of 
key update, we make the standard assumption that nodes 
contain a tamper-proof module to store secrets. We describe 
these attack scenarios in Section VI.  
III.    PRELIMINARIES 
   WSNs can be built in a number of ways depending on the 
desired application [15]. Often, several types of nodes are 
present, classified in terms of the role they play, such as 
gathering data, analyzing data, deploying applications etc.  
   An intuitive analysis of the sensor network activities of a 
simple network leads to mapping tasks to roles as follows: 
Member node – senses and transmits data 
Aggregator node – controls member nodes and senses, 
collects, aggregates, analyses and transmits data 
Base station – controls the system and collects, analyses, 
transmits and stores data. 
   Since all sensor nodes in the network are essentially 
deployed to collaboratively sense target events, all nodes 
must assume the functions of a member node. Aggregator 
nodes, in addition, take on the responsibility of coordinating 
the sensing activities in their neighbouring region (also 
known as a sensing zone) and aggregate and forward the 
information to the base station. The task of coordination is 
not a simple one and it is also not a short term job. In order to 
provide instantaneous sensing and reporting capability 
(dependent upon sensing applications) each aggregator node 
may need to systematically rotate its responsibilities 
transparently among neighbouring nodes without much 
communication overhead.  
   For the purposes of an attack situation in which nodes can 
be lost or compromised, detection and recovery can only take 
place efficiently if the network can function as normally as 
possible. We propose to therefore retain connectivity and 
maximize flexibility in the network. This is achieved by 
allowing each node to play the role of either a member or 
aggregator node as appropriate under the conditions arising, 
and at the same time, for the entire network to efficiently 
re-organize itself in order to remain connected.  
    Our platform is TinyOS Version 2.1 implemented on 
Crossbow’s TelosB sensor nodes [21]. 
A.   Assumptions 
   Before proceeding further we present out system 
assumptions. These are: 
•    We assume the existence of a globally unique ID for 
each sensor node. The base station keeps track of all IDs. 
•    We assume that every node in the WSN is in 
transmission range of the base station, while it is not 
necessarily the case that each node can transmit to the 
BS. Because some nodes may not be in range of other 
nodes, all reprogramming and re-clustering commands 
will therefore be run through the base station. 
•    We assume that each sensor node has a secret value 
which can be used for authentication. This secret is 
known only to the base station and the node and is 
allocated when the WSN is set up. We also assume that 
this secret is stored in a tamper-resistant section of the 
node. (Note that while tamper resistance might be a 
viable defence for physical node compromise for some 
networks, we do not see it as a general purpose solution. 
Thus, we assume that an attacker may be capable of 
retrieving the entire set of codes residing in the node. 
However, in order to implement authentication, it is 
important to have some item residing on the node which 
cannot be retrieved or identified as being a ‘secret’.)   
•    We assume that the base station is trustworthy in the 
sense that it is never compromised and always behaves 
correctly. (Most, but not all routing protocols depend on 
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 nodes to trust messages from base stations.) 
•    We assume that an essentially infinite timer is available 
to each of the nodes and the base station. (In practice, 
timers on nodes may overflow and re-use previous times 
which invalidates our protocol.) 
•    We assume that the same hash function code is 
programmed into each node at set-up. This code will be 
used for authentication. 
 
   Figure 1 illustrates the topology of the envisioned WSN. It 
comprises a large number of low-resource sensor nodes that 
are connected to a base station (BS) in order to analyze the 
sensed data. By partitioning the WSN topology into a set of 
clusters, a hierarchical network topology is obtained that is 







   Each cluster comprises one aggregator (AG) and in general 
several cluster members (CMs). Each CM is always 
connected to a single associated AG to exchange data and 
control packets. 
   In transmitting critical messages between nodes and the 
base station, in particular, commands to re-cluster or to 
reprogram nodes in response to an attack, message 
authentication is critical as a denial of service attack can 
easily be implemented without it.  
IV.    THE PROTOCOL 
   In this section, we describe each of the protocols of Section 
1 in detail. In each case, a node with ID n contains secret Sn, 
R represents a random value but is in fact the local time 
obtained from the LocalTime.get() command in TinyOS, M 
represents a message to reprogram or re-cluster or a request 
that another node be reprogrammed. All messages 
transmitted include node ID of both sender and receiver, 
including that of the BS. 
   A simple hash function check achieves authentication of a 
message. We use two well-known functions, SHA-1 and 
Rabin for the purposes of comparison. SHA-1 is a preferred 
hash in government authentication protocols [3; Section 
3.9.12], [16] and has been employed by several researchers in 
TinyOS applications ([10], [12]). Our second choice is the 
Rabin encryption system [19] adapted for use as a hash 
function as proposed by Shamir in [20]. While Shamir 
suggests an adaptation of Rabin’s scheme to what he calls 
SQUASH, based on improved methods of computing the 
hash output, our implementation is constrained by TinyOS 
requirements and so we use smaller values than those 
proposed to ensure the security of SQUASH. Such smaller 
values do not warrant use of the improved SQUASH 
computations, and so we use Rabin’s scheme as proposed in 
[19]. Shamir points out [20] that, used as a hash function, the 
Rabin encryption scheme can be implemented securely on 
many fewer bits than needed for encryption.  The drawback 
of Rabin’s scheme is that up to four input messages can result 
in the same ciphertext. Since we use the scheme only for 
authentication based on a small set of standard message 
inputs, this is not a problem for us. 
   We take data input of 8 bits, 32 bits and 64 bits for SHA-1 
and 64 bits for Rabin. 
A.   Reprogramming Protocol from the Base Station to a 
Compromised Node 
   Because the BS monitors network communications, it can 
detect an attack.  It would deal with it in the early stages by 
authenticated reprogramming and re-clustering. The 
objective is to prolong the life of the WSN for as long as 
possible; compromise of over 50% of the nodes would be 
deemed failure.   
   The BS has determined that node with ID n needs 
reprogramming. If a set of nodes is to be reprogrammed, each 
node must receive a separate message as each contains the 
secret known only by that node and by the base station. H 
represents a hash function. We assume that n, M and R are 
the appropriate size for input to H. 
 
Figure 2: Authenticating a reprogramming request 
Figure 1: Clustered topology of wireless sensor network 
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 (a) BS XORs the secret Sn, the reprogramming message M 
and the local time R to obtain m. 
(b) BS computes H(m) = c. 
(c) BS transmits c, M and R which are received by n. 
(d) Node n re-computes H of the XOR of n with Sn, M and R 
and checks that it is c. 
(e) If the check is ‘true’ AND the time R has not been used in 
a reprogramming request earlier, the node reprograms. 
(f) The node updates its secret to Sn= m. 
(g)The node informs the BS that it has successfully 
reprogrammed and the BS then updates the node’s secret in 
its table. 
B.   Reprogramming Protocol from an Aggregator Node to 
the Base Station on Behalf of a Compromised Node. 
In this protocol, an aggregator node A has determined that 
one of the nodes in its cluster must be reprogrammed. Since 
reprogramming is intensive from the initiator side, only the 
BS can implement it. Thus, A requests reprogramming from 
the BS. 
(a) A retrieves the ID n of the node to be reprogrammed.  
(b)A XORs n, its own secret SA, the request for 
reprogramming message M and the local time R to obtain m. 
(c) A computes H(m) = c. 
(d) A transmits c, n, M and R to the BS. 
(e) The BS retrieves SA, re-computes the hash and checks if it 
is c. 
(f) If the check is ‘true’ AND the time R has not been used in a 
reprogramming request earlier, BS initiates protocol A. 
 
 
Figure 3: Authenticating a reprogramming request from an aggregator 
C.   Re-clustering Protocol from the Base Station to the 
Network. 
   Re-clustering may need to be implemented after an attack 
on a WSN in case several nodes are no longer trust-worthy. 
The BS makes this decision, based on information gathered 
from the network. Once it has been made, it sends a 
re-clustering message to all aggregator nodes to begin the 
procedure. In this protocol, we describe the authenticated 
message to re-cluster which must be sent to each node 
separately, identifying it by its ID and its secret. 
(a) The BS retrieves the secrets S1,… Sc of each node and for 
each node ID n, XORs its secret Sn, the re-clustering message 
M and the local time R to obtain mn. 
(b) The BS then computes H(mn) for each n and transmits it 
with M and R to the corresponding node n. 
(c) Each node XORs its secret Sn, M and R to obtain mn.  
(d)Each node computes H(mn) and compares with the 
messages received from the BS. If there is a match AND if no 
such message with time R has been used in a re-clustering 
request earlier, n accepts this as a valid re-clustering 
message. 
(e) Once all nodes have received and verified such a 
message, re-clustering commences. 
 
 
Figure 4: The BS authenticates re-clustering messages to nodes 
 
   When running this protocol, the timing must be managed. 
A Timer.startOneShot(2000) command is set to fire in 2000 
ms from the time of invocation at the base station. This 
cancels any previously running timer and will only fire once, 
then stop. This gives enough time for the node in the network 
to receive and verify the hash message before the base station 
starts another timer. The protocol is complete when the last 
node verifies the hash message. Timing synchronization is 
not required. We require only that the timer value 
(independently scheduled at node) be set to a value (we use 
2000msec) that allows for the hash computation to complete. 
   We tested all three protocols on TinyOS Version 2.1 with 
the results presented in the following tables. Table 1 shows 
the time, ROM and RAM used by the reprogramming 
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 protocol for four applications of hash function. Although the 
execution time does not vary, Rabin uses only 83 to 85% of 
the RAM and ROM used by  SHA-1 on 64 bits. 
 





SHA-1 (8 bits) 6.0 1230 19802 
SHA-1 (32 bits) 6.0 1262 20178 
SHA-1 (64 bits) 6.0 1334 21034 
Rabin (64 bits) 6.0 1100 17972 
Table 1. Performance of reprogramming protocol from the base station to a 
compromised node 
 
   The same distinctions are apparent when running protocol 
II. Again, while execution time does not vary, ROM and 
RAM for Rabin are only 84 to 86% that of SHA-1 on 64 bits. 
 






SHA-1(8 bits) 10.0 1262 20556 
SHA-1 (32 bits) 10.0 1296 20948 
SHA-1 (64 bits) 10.0 1368 21796 
Rabin (64 bits) 10.0 1142 18830 
Table 2. Performance of reprogramming protocol from an aggregator node 
to the base station on behalf of a compromised node 
 
   Protocols I and II were run 100 times with no substantial 
difference in results. Tables 1 and 2 average these results. 
   For protocol III, because the distribution of messages needs 
to be associated with timers, the implementation is 
significantly more complex than that for the previous 
protocols; therefore we ran this protocol only five times. 
Table 3 presents the average results of running protocol III 
five times with a set of 5 TelosB motes. In each case, time 
starts when the BS issues its first message and stops when the 
last node verifies the hash message. 
 






SHA-1 (8 bits) 30.0 1350 22978 
SHA-1 (32 bits) 30.0 1382 23968 
SHA-1 (64 bits) 30.0 1454 26340 
Rabin (64 bits) 30.0 1220 21686 
Table 3. Performance of re-clustering protocol from the base station to the 
network 
 
   Once again, execution time does not vary. We believe that 
this is because the actual execution time of the hash function 
is significantly smaller than that of the rest of the protocol 
and therefore has negligible influence. (We show the hash 
times in the next section.)  It may be that in a large network 
with thousands of nodes, the execution time of the hash 
function begins to play a role. 
   In all cases, Rabin uses less memory, both RAM and ROM, 
than SHA-1. This is particularly useful in applications 
requiring small memory usage. The security of the 
algorithms is likely to be comparable as both have been 
available for some time and are well understood by the 
cryptographic community. While Rabin on 64 bits is not 
acceptably secure as an encryption mechanism, it is 
sufficiently strong as a hash function. Therefore, we 
recommend the use of Rabin to generate hashes in 
lightweight environments. 
V.    THE HASH FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATION 
   It is worthwhile to compare, independently of the 
protocols, the performance of our two hash functions. While 
SHA-1 is a standard choice, it is clear from Table 4 below 
that Rabin is faster with smaller RAM and ROM. 
   SHA-1 and Rabin are implemented as follows on TinyOS 
Version 2.1. For comparison, we take data input of 8 bits, 32 
bits and 64 bits for SHA-1 and 64 bits for Rabin. As shown in 
Table 4, for SHA-1 the code consumes 126 bytes of RAM, 
3892 bytes for 8 bits, 3896 bytes for 32 bits and 3900 bytes 
for 64 bits of ROM, and takes approximately 7 ms to produce 
a 160-bit hash of different sizes of messages. Rabin produces 
a consecutive 32-bit hash window for a 64-bit calculated 
hash. The code consumes 46 bytes of RAM and 1870 bytes of 
ROM, and takes approximately 2 ms to hash a message of 
64-bits. 
 






SHA-1 (8 bits) 7 126 3892 
SHA-1 (32 bits) 7 126 3896 
SHA-1 (64 bits) 7 126 3900 
Rabin (64 bits) 2 46 1870 
Table 4. Comparison of the Rabin and SHA-1 hash functions 
 
   Lee, Choi and Kim [12] have introduced a Hash component 
for TinyOS, designed to be used as an independent hash 
module with TinySec.  According to the authors, this hash 
module accepts any hash function, and can be implemented 
on 8, 16 and 32 bit words.  
   We compared time and memory for our implementation of 
SHA-1 against theirs and also against an implementation in 
[10]. While we found that our results, from Table 4, are better 
than those in [12], 2005, and [10], 2008, for 8 or 32 bit input, 
we note that their papers do not specify the TinyOS version 
used and we believe that the difference is due to their use of 
an earlier version of TinyOS or different coding structure or 
techniques. 
VI.    ATTACK SCENARIOS 
   The standard attack scenarios in a WSN setting are known 
as the passive and active attack [18] models for 
communication compromises. In a passive attack, the 
intruder is able to capture and interpret data, thus extracting 
information; our protocols  are not designed to protect against 
a passive attack. 
In an active attack, both the integrity and the availability of 
the communication are threatened.  An intruder 
implementing an active attack may destroy the integrity of a 
communication in two ways:  by changing the content of the 
communication and by changing the authorship of the 
communication. An intruder implementing an active attack 
may also 
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 - capture a communication and delete it altogether  
- resend it at a later time, or  
- resend several communications many times in a flooding 
attack. 
   An additional active attack which we will consider here is a 
situation where a compromised node which has received a 
reprogramming message sends an acknowledgement without 
actually reprogramming. In other words, it lies about having 
reprogrammed.  
   Here we discuss how each of these attacks is managed in 
the network 
Passive Attack Scenarios 
We assume here that a set of intruders or compromised nodes 
collaborate to implement a passive attack by capturing 
communications.  Our architecture allows this to happen and 
allows such colluders to read data as it is all sent in the clear.   
The colluders may hope to capture WSN secrets Sn shared by 
the BS and node n.  These are never sent in the clear, but only 
in hashed communications; if colluders capture the hashes, 
they cannot determine the secrets.  Even if the colluders 
include compromised nodes in the WSN, these share no 
secrets with other nodes and therefore are unable to capture 
secrets of nodes not in the collusion. 
Active Attack Scenarios 
We identified several types of active attack earlier in this 
section.  Here, we consider each of them.  Note that as our 
protocol is designed only to provide recovery message and 
source authentication in this paper; and we cannot 
necessarily guarantee protection against all attacks 
mentioned here. 
(i)   Message Content Changes 
In this attack a set C of colluders of intruders and 
compromised WSN nodes attempt to change the content of a 
captured recovery message M broadcast from the BS.  Such a 
message was intended for node n.  C changes M to M’ and 
produces c′ and R′. However, in order to compute a valid 
hash, C needs to have the valid secret Sn of the target node.  
Thus our protocol protects against such an attack: h(m) ≠ 
h(Sn⊗M′⊗R′). 
(ii).   Message Authorship changes 
Assume that a set of colluders C comprising intruders and 
compromised nodes wishes to send a recovery message to a 
node n and pretends that such a message originates from the 
BS.  In this case, as in scenarios (i), C needs access to the 
secret Sn shared by the BS and node n.  It does not have this 
information.  A similar problem arises in protocol III where 
the  message originates from an aggregator and is directed to 
the BS.  Thus, our architecture protects against a message 
authorship attack. 
(iii).   Message Deletion 
Assume that a set C of intruders and compromised nodes 
colludes to delete recovery messages in the WSN.  A key 
assumption (see the Introduction) is that the network, via the 
 BS, has the ability to detect compromised nodes.  This is 
usually done by monitoring network message flow.  Thus the 
BS can detect  interruption of communications within the 
network, but our architecture for authentication does not have 
the capability of  recovering deleted messages.  In dealing 
with such a disruption the BS would attempt to recover 
compromises nodes by, for instance, reprogramming. 
(iv)  Message Replay 
A set C of intruders and compromised nodes attempts to 
replay a valid recovery message M, R and h(m) =  issued by 
an aggregator or the BS.  If C sends M, R and h(m) = c 
captured earlier, the node (or BS) receiving the information 
checks if it has previously received such a message with the 
same value for R. If it has, it drops the corresponding packets.  
If C computes the current time R′ and sends this along with 
the captured M and h(m) = c,  the recipient will compute 
h(Sn⊗M⊗R′) ≠ c.  Thus our protocol protects against replay 
attacks. 
(v)   Flooding 
Assume a collusion C of intruders and compromised nodes 
captures and resends network messages in a flooding attack.  
Because the BS monitors network communications, it can 
detect such an attack.  It would attempt to deal with it by 
reprogramming and reclosing but there is no guarantee of 
success.  Our authentication architecture alone cannot protect 
against such an attack.   
(vi)   A compromised node lies 
In this attack, we assume that a compromised node has 
received a reprogramming request from the BS. It attempts to 
send an acknowledgement to the BS confirming that it has 
reprogrammed and re-instated its original code. In order to do 
this, it must compute a hash of its secret along with the 
current time and an acknowledgement M: h(Sn⊗M⊗R′). 
However, we assume that the attacker does not have access to 
the tamper-proof section of the node and so cannot compute 
this. 
VII.    COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE 
   In this section, we compare our results with those of other 
researchers who have developed authentication protocols for 
a similar situation.  
   In [2], Benenson, Gedicke and Raivio establish an 
authentication protocol for a WSN based on elliptic curve 
cryptography. This paper is the only other paper in the 
literature proposing a WSN authentication protocol without a 
key-discovery phase: a user in a fixed location broadcasts 
identity and a certificate.  A node responds with a nonce. The 
user replies with a hash.  
   1 hash and 2 verifications are needed while in our protocol 
only 1 hash and 1 verification are needed. The authors of [2] 
rely on the existence of a third party trusted certificate 
authority while we assume only that the BS is trusted. In 
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 summary, we avoid the need for a trusted third party and 
reduce the number of verifications.  
   Benenson, Gedicke and Raivio implemented their protocol 
on five TelosB motes using TinyOS. The hash function 
SHA-1 on 64 bits was used in [2] to hash the identities of the 
sender and receiver along with a random number. We see in 
Table 5 that our protocol is more than 10 times faster and 








Benenson, Gedicke, Raivio    [2] 440 2000 45500 
Our protocol III with SHA-1 30 1454 26340 
Our protocol III with Rabin 30 1220 21686 
Table 5. Comparison of two implementations of protocol C 
 
   They point out that the execution time is disappointing due 
to the long execution times of the elliptic curve cryptography 
routines. Note also, that in their protocol, motes must be 
capable of executing both symmetric and public key 
cryptographic protocols and must be able to securely store 
secret keys.  
VIII.    CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we focus on recovery after an attack has been 
detected and provide lightweight protocols for re-clustering 
and for reprogramming nodes in a WSN. We provide a 
message authentication protocol for limited resource sensor 
networks enabling the network to securely implement 
recovery strategies efficiently and effectively. The protocol 
is based on hash functions and we compare the performance 
of two well-known lightweight hash functions, SHA-1 and 
Rabin. We demonstrate that our authentication protocol can 
be implemented efficiently with TelosB motes in comparison 
with existing protocols. 
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